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What is the ideal consensus conference,  
and how would we recognize it if we saw one? 
 
Jan R. Coe 





The consensus conference is a participatory mechanism that envisages ordinary citizens engaging with 
experts (scientists and other knowledge producers) on issues of compelling social significance. It invites 
ordinary citizens to bring their life experience and values to the serious consideration of a technology that 
may have far-reaching consequences.  Three selected examples of consensus conferences are 
examined in order to see how they match the ideal. The paper concludes with thoughts about the 
adequacy of evaluation frameworks and suggest that a more dynamic model of consensus conference 
evaluation (based on public understanding of science models) might invite more compelling reflections 
about the success or failure of a particular consensus conference. 
 
 
The consensus conference is an inherently positive, idealistic, and value-laden type of 
participatory mechanism that envisages ordinary citizens engaging with experts (scientists and other 
knowledge producers) on issues of compelling social significance. It invites ordinary citizens to bring their 
life experience and values to the serious consideration of a technology that may have far-reaching 
consequences. The local mechanic, dentist, homemaker, teacher, retiree, or tree surgeon are tapped - 
but not the tree-hugger - because these folks should not have any hidden agendas nor know anything 
substantive about the topic under consideration. Paradoxically, they stand a chance of being selected if 
they possess the right kind of “ignorance” and yet are also judged to be open-minded, willing and able to 
tackle the topic, and available – the loss of six or seven day’s income is no hardship for these citizens. 
Perhaps this all sounds too good to be true. Can ordinary citizens bring “tutored preferences” to bear in 
order to inform scientific and technological priorities? Or are citizens bound to live in a society in which 
only the science elites, technocrats or politicians decide which programs or applications are developed or 
funded?  
To put these questions in context I will need to explain my choice of the consensus conference as 
an exemplar of the connections I see between the ideals of science, deliberative democracy, and 
participatory technology assessment that we encountered in this course. In this I share the following 
critical observations by Torres, et. al. (2004): 
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Deliberation is often viewed as superior to traditional forms of public involvement 
through which individuals or organizations state their viewpoints. Deliberation offers a 
different structure, resulting substance, and civic benefits. Through deliberation, the 
public is able to come to a better shared understanding of underlying issues, make 
substantively better policy recommendations, reduce friction, and experience 
“empowerment” as individual citizens. It is expected (but not known) that the civic 
benefits of deliberation–education, engagement, and social capital–can smooth 
implementation and provide lasting benefits for democratic life. Furthermore, decision-
makers profit from the experience by acquiring substantial information about the values, 
aspirations, and specific concerns or recommendations of citizens on an issue, 
reinforcing their leadership position. At the same time, the likelihood of future conflict over 
the issues is substantially reduced and the road paved for successful, lasting 
implementation (p.2).  
 
I introduce and employ a parallel I see between the notion of “well-ordered science” proposed by 
Philip Kitcher in Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001) and participatory mechanisms in order to ground 
the discussion of consensus conferences. I will follow this with a discussion on why and how the 
consensus conference model developed and, following Kitcher, suggest that the concept of an “ideal” 
consensus conference based on a particular evaluation framework is useful way to examine this 
particular participatory mechanism. Three selected examples of consensus conferences will then be 
examined in order to see how they match the ideal delineated within the framework. The paper will 
conclude with thoughts about the adequacy of evaluation frameworks and suggest that a more dynamic 
model of consensus conference evaluation (based on public understanding of science models) might 
invite more compelling reflections about the success or failure of a particular consensus conference. 
 
“Well-ordered science” 
 I was struck by the idea of well-ordered science when we encountered it early in the course. 
Kitcher suggests that we can envisage a process that would allow citizens with “tutored preferences” to 
not only set scientific research priorities based on social values, but to allocate resources for them and 
decide how the results from these projects would be applied. Does not this “ideal” process have some 
similarity with the manner in which a consensus conference is conducted? In what follows, I give a bare 
bones explication of what Kitcher calls the ‘ideal inquiry’ without any of the richness and elaboration of the 
original, but just enough to establish points that I believe the two enterprises share.  
The citizens, called ideal deliberators, engage in a process that is based on three decisions: 1) 
How are resources initially to be assigned to projects? 2) What are the constraints on morally permissible 
investigation? 3) How are the results of the investigation to be applied? Kitcher takes up step 2, the 
constraints on inquiry, separately. This phase mirrors the problems that consensus conference organizers 
face with regard to representation of points of view and Kitcher provides a process to deal with 
divergence of opinion. The first and third phases bear a close resemblance to what occurs in a consensus 
conference. Citizens come together (Kitcher does not elaborate on how these particular individuals are 
chosen or appointed) first of all to discuss what areas of inquiry to pursue. He continues: 
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The first thing to recognize is that … they are likely to begin from a very partial 
understanding of the possibilities. An obvious remedy for their ignorance is to insist on 
transmitting information so that each deliberator becomes aware of the significance, 
epistemic and practical, attaching to the potential lines of inquiry. Ideal deliberation must 
involve presenting the structure of significance graphs, where the multiform sources of 
significance are revealed. Once this as been accomplished, the deliberators revise their 
own initial preferences to accommodate the new information…The product of the 
consideration is a collection of lists of outcomes the deliberators would like scientific 
inquiry to promote, coupled with some sort of index measuring how intensely they desire 
those outcomes. Personal preferences have given way to tutored preferences (Kitcher, 
p.118). 
 
As all the possibilities are put on the table, the deliberators have a chance to explain to each other why 
they want particular outcomes to particular degrees and also to listen respectfully to the preferences of 
others. The aim is to arrive at consensus from among the competing claims and rationales. Kitcher 
outlines an iterative process to follow if this should not occur in the first instance. The third step in his 
process would be to assess whether particular scientific projects might deliver what the ideal deliberators 
collectively desire. In order to do this, it is “appropriate to turn…to groups of experts” (p.119). In this 
aspect, the ideal inquiry mirrors the consensus conference process – in reverse. The citizens decide what 
projects they want science to pursue and then summon experts to give them the probabilities that the 
scientific projects will yield the particular desired outcomes; in the consensus conference, citizens are 
informed by experts first and then deliberate on the basis of what they have learned. Again, Kitcher has a 
process to deal with issues arising out of the choice of - and potential disagreement among - the experts.  
 A “disinterested arbitrator” (facilitator?) uses the information about probabilities, together with the 
collective wish list, and draws up possible agendas for inquiry to which resources will be assigned. The 
final phase consists in a judgment by the ideal deliberators of the appropriate budgetary level and the 
research agenda to be followed at that budgetary level (p.121).  
 There have been a number of critiques of well-ordered science as the standard against which to 
measure real institutions and models (Hausmann, 2003, Kimmelman, 2002, Jamieson, 2002, Lewontin, 
2002). Indeed, even Kitcher says “…there’s no thought that well-ordered science must actually institute 
the complicated discussions I’ve envisaged…” but, “…what we would like, I suggest, is a feasible 
approximation” (p.123). I adopt this approach by proposing to sketch what the ‘ideal’ consensus 
conference would look like. That many do not reach the ideal is not a reason to abandon the strategy; 
rather, it might point the way to an evaluation process that will refine and build upon the consensus 
conference model so that it truly reflects democratic deliberation of science policy. 
 
Origins and development of the consensus conference 
The consensus conference is one of several methods that arose in the 1980s to try to inject more 
participation by average citizens into policy decisions regarding the development and use of technologies. 
This strategy was deemed necessary due to what was perceived as a loss of confidence in science as a 
factor in social progress. Many writers have situated the public’s disaffection with science to have 
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occurred following incidents such as Love Canal, nuclear power plant meltdowns both at home and 
abroad, toxic oil spills, and the BSE crisis. Such loss of public confidence is reputed to have been the 
impetus for the birth of the traditional ‘public understanding of science’ (PUS) field, in which the public’s 
lack of trust was equated with a lack of information about science and scientists. The “deficit” model of the 
PUS has been challenged by the critical or deliberative model, which maintains that the problem is not 
that the public does not listen to science, but that science does not listen to the public (Horst, 2005). 
Waiting in the wings is a third model, the network model, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
For now, it can be posited that governments in Europe and the United States looked for ways to 
re-engage their populations with the aim of continuing the public support that that science and technology 
had previously enjoyed. Those countries with a formalized technology assessment agency were well 
positioned to work on this issue because of their dual role as information providers to constituents (the 
Congress or Parliament) and as gatekeepers.  Ironically, the United States Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA), which was established a full ten years before European technology assessment 
organizations and the agency upon which a number of such entities were modeled, closed down in 1995 - 
the year that the Danish Parliament established the Danish Board of Technology (DBT) as an 
independent body (Van Eijndhoven, 1997). The DBT has a direct connection with the decision-making 
body in Denmark (the Danish Parliament or Folketing) of which the countries that adopt its model can 
only dream. The Danish consensus conference model is only one of a number of participatory 
engagement methods that the DBT uses to evaluate and to promote ongoing discussion about 
technology.  In Denmark, the decision to make use of the consensus conference method typically follows 
an annual procedure of identifying issues to be assessed, characterizing the main aspects of these issues 
("the problem") and deciding who are the main "customers" or "target groups" of the assessment. In other 
words, the consensus conference method is chosen if and when it is deemed suitable for dealing with a 
specific issue that is up for assessment (Klϋver, et.al, 2000). 
It was not just happy accident that the consensus conference model evolved in Denmark, 
however. Danish culture, particularly in education, was influenced by a beloved historical figure, N.F.S. 
Grundtvig (1783-1872), a social and educational reformer. His folk school (folkelig køjskole) was 
conceived as a place where the native Danish language would be used to teach the ordinary citizens 
instead of the classical Latin and Greek of the exclusive universities. He had a strong belief in the abilities 
and wisdom of the ordinary people above the educated and elite. The term folkelighed that came to 
inform this institution is a multidimensional one. It can refer “to enlightened, responsible and tolerant 
participation in the exercise of power," "the quality of being of the people," or just plain "peopleness" 
(Borish, 1991). The tradition of people having a say in matters that affect them thus builds upon a 
sensibility that has long been integrated into Danish institutions. 
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What is the Danish “model” – does it come close to the ideal? 
The Danish consensus conference model will be described in somewhat greater detail in order to 
provide a basis for comparison of the three case studies from the U.K., U.S., and Australia to follow. 
The Danish Board of Technology has a store of experience and expertise that allows it to fit the 
issue to the method rather than the other way around. The choice of the consensus conference format is 
dependent upon the topic fulfilling the criteria of: 1) having current social relevance; 2) presupposing 
expert contributions; 3) being possible to delimit; 4) containing unclear attitudinal issues (DBT, 2005). The 
Steering Committee members are selected and assessed by the Board, which aims at a comprehensive 
coverage of the topic, vis à vis members’ expertise. The Steering Committee approves the composition of 
the lay panel and draws up the list of possible experts.  
 The lay panel is recruited through newspaper ads and by sending out invitations to 1,000-2,000 
randomly selected individuals over the age of 18. Those wishing to participate write a letter to the DBT, 
detailing some information about themselves and their motives for participating. Although the DBT aims to 
find non-experts, it places emphasis on the open-mindedness of the citizens and their desire to “probe the 
work of the experts” (DBT, 2005). A project manager who is also an employee of the Secretariat of the 
DBT is charged with the day-to-day management of the conference, and is assisted by a secretary. A 
facilitator whose special skills and training are in communication and group dynamics is employed to 
assist the lay panel, manage the preparatory weekends, and chair the conference. The preparatory 
weekends are used to introduce the participants to each other and to facilitate their working together as a 
group. They discuss the explanatory materials they have received and begin to formulate key questions 
and sub-questions. The panel may invite short presentations which often relate to ethical or legal aspects 
of the topic.  
 Day 1 of the conference is usually the first contact the panel has with the experts. Citizens hear 
from 10–15 presentations (around 20-30 minutes in length) on the specific questions they submitted to 
the experts. Day 2 is reserved for supplementary questions and any clarification that the lay panel 
requires. The final document is prepared beginning on the afternoon or evening of the second day. The 
facilitator is crucial in this process to ensure that all members have a voice. The work will often be carried 
out in smaller groups dealing with 2-3 related questions each. Day 3 is the presentation of the report 
which is read aloud by three of the lay panelists to an audience of the public, media, and may include 
parliamentary representatives. Experts are allowed to correct any technical errors, but not to alter the 
actual content. The final document is immediately disseminated to members of the Danish Parliament 
(Grunwald, 1995; Andersen & Jaeger, 1999; Bereano, 1999). 
 
Transplantation of the Danish model 
 The Danish model of consensus conference was introduced in a much-cited 1995 article by 
Richard Sclove titled “Town Meetings on Technology.” Anticipating the objection that such an innovation 
might work well in Denmark with its relatively small, homogenous population in comparison to the 
  6 
unwieldy, diverse and pluralistic population of the United States, Sclove drew a comparison with the 
practice of juries to reach consensus on “highly contested, complex legal disputes” (Sclove, 1995). He 
also pointed to success in the U.K. as an example of a populous, racially and socioeconomically diverse 
country that had recently concluded its first consensus conference. So, how successful were these first 
attempts to replicate the Danish model? (In the interests of space, readers are referred to the self-
compiled tables in the Appendix for more details about each consensus conference than could usefully be 
accommodated in the text.) 
 
U.K. National Consensus Conference on Plant Biotechnology (1994) 
 The Plant Biotech Consensus Conference of 1994 was the first Danish-style consensus 
conference to be attempted in the U.K. Organized by the Science Museum and funded by the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) it was composed of a 16-member lay 
panel, and a 21-member expert group. The conference followed the Danish model with some local 
changes that ultimately led to charges of bias by members of NGOs. Instead of one or two speakers 
presenting information at the preparatory weekends, the Plant Biotech organizers brought in 7 experts in 
the first weekend and 12 at the second weekend. The first day of the conference (ordinarily the first 
occasion for presentations from experts) the lay panel heard from 21 experts (Klϋver, 2005). As a first 
attempt at a deliberative participatory technology assessment, the topic of plant biotechnology was 
chosen for its less controversial nature, compared to cloning and other hot button issues at the time 
(Purdue, 1999). Ironically, both pro- and anti-biotechnology groups claimed that the lay panel’s report 
supported their respective positions. 
 
U.S. Citizen’s Panel on Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy (1997) 
 The first U.S. consensus conference took place in 1997, three years after initial planning for it had 
begun by major proponent Richard Sclove. Participating organizations included the non-profit Loka 
Institute, the Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship (EPIIC) program at Tufts 
University, and various other academic and governmental organizations. A directorate composed of four 
members from the principal sponsoring organizations established the 12-member Steering Committee 
which then put together the lay panel of 15 citizens. Citizens were contacted by random phone calling and 
supplementary targeted recruitment to be broadly representative of wider Boston's population. The 
telecommunications theme was chosen by the directorate members with a view to upcoming decisions 
concerning Internet access and other aspects of telecommunications reform. The format generally 
followed the Danish model. The above notwithstanding, the consensus report was judged to be too broad 
and “not timely to congressional needs” to have had an impact on policy and/or legislation (Guston, 
1998).  
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Australian Consensus Conference on Gene Technology in the Food Chain (1999) 
Australia joined a number of other nations by holding its first consensus conference in 1999. It 
was an initiative of the Australian Consumers Association (ACA) which, interestingly, put out a bid for 
sponsorship of the conference to a wide range of organizations that included the nation’s premier 
scientific research organization, the Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organization (CSIRO). The 
Australian Museum won the sponsorship and jointly with the ACA established the Steering Committee. 
The topic was chosen by the ACA and the conference was timed to coincide with an upcoming decision 
by the Commonwealth government on gene technology and food regulation. The local format differed 
from the Danish model in that every stakeholder group that joined was able to place a representative on 
the Steering Committee, making it quite large at 17-members. The 14-member lay panel was recruited by 
a market research company hired for that purpose and a sub-committee of the Steering Committee 
provided a list of expert speakers to the panel who had the ultimate choice of experts. A professional 
evaluator was brought in late in the process which had a bearing on the comprehensiveness of the 
assessment. The consensus report produced by the lay panel showed a basic caution towards gene 
technology but not an outright rejection. A number of issues of concern were identified by the evaluators 
with respect to the conference process, in particular the methodology by which the experts and lay panel 
were chosen (McKay, 1999). 
 
Evaluations of consensus conferences 
It is not surprising that every aspect of the consensus conference model has been examined, 
poked, prodded, de-constructed and experimented with by proponents who are eager to institute 
participatory forms of technology assessment in their own countries. A fair question to be asked now is: 
have they been effective? The first response would have to be “how do you define effectiveness?” Where 
there is silence on that question, the default answer has to be “it depends,” for there are few standardized 
criteria by which to judge whether the objectives of a particular engagement exercise have been met. 
Indeed, in some cases even the organizers themselves had not adequately addressed the issue of 
objectives (Rowe, Horlick-Jones, Walls, & Pidgeon, 2005). As for evaluation or assessment of a 
consensus conference “bolted on” after the fact, the situation is even more problematic. Some organizers 
found that their funding did not stretch to an independent evaluation, or simply got so caught up in the 
mechanics of the event that the formal evaluation was overlooked or tacked on midway through (McKay, 
1999).  
Several attempts have been made to formulate schema or frameworks in order to establish the 
criteria upon which a consensus conference may be evaluated (Guston, 1998; Rowe, 2000; Rowe, Marsh 
and Frewer, 2004 & Rowe, Horlick-Jones, Walls, and Pidgeon, 2005). By examining one of these 
frameworks, I hope to follow the approach outlined by Kitcher in his project of “well-ordered science.” That 
is, it might be possible to measure how an individual consensus conference rates by holding it up to what 
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[some] researchers have tentatively idenified as the “ideal” participatory mechanism. In a systematic effort 
to address the evaluation issue, Rowe and Frewer (2000) identified the criteria listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Acceptance and Process criteria developed by Rowe & Frewer (2000) 
 
Acceptance criteria 
• Representativeness  
o The public participants should comprise a broadly representative sample of the 
population of the affected public. 
• Independence  
o The participation process should be conducted in an independent, unbiased way. 
• Early Involvement  
o The public should be involved as early as possible in the process as soon as value 
judgments become salient. 
• Influence  
o The output of the procedure should have a genuine impact on policy. 
• Transparency  
o The process should be transparent so that the public can see what is going on and 
how decisions are being made 
• Resource Accessibility  
o Public participants should have access to the appropriate resources to enable them 
to successfully fulfill their brief. 
Process criteria 
• Task Definition 
o The nature and scope of the participation task should be clearly defined. 
• Structured Decision-making  
o The participation exercise should use/provide appropriate mechanisms for structuring 
and displaying the decision-making process. 
• Cost Effectiveness 
o The procedure should in some sense be cost effective. 
 
The authors divide the criteria into acceptance criteria, which establish benchmarks by which to 
measure the construction and implementation of the participation exercise (i.e., outcome), and process 
criteria, which relate to the potential public acceptance of the exercise. Both kinds of criteria are 
considered necessary because of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the consensus 
conference. The criteria were distilled from a number of suggested criteria the authors found in the 
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literature. (The checklist Rowe and Frewer developed to allow for more ‘fine grained’ analysis of each 
criterion is available in the Appendix, p. 29). 
 The evaluations of the three consensus conferences described above present a number of 
difficulties with respect to the application of these criteria. Evaluators used a variety of instruments 
(questionnaires, interviews, recordings and transcripts, background documents given to participants and 
so on) but there is no parity to be found among them in terms of whether the evaluation was integral to 
the planning for the event; whether the organizers allowed the evaluators be present at all Steering 
Committee planning meetings and access to accompanying documents; the amount of interaction 
allowed between the facilitator and the experts and a host of other variables. My original plan to apply 
Rowe and Frewer’s criteria in toto is thus not a workable exercise, so I propose instead to extract and 
review only a few key criteria that can be applied across the three examples in the hope that the process 
will yield some insight into the components for an “ideal” consensus conference.  
 
The criterion of representation 
 From the summaries above, it will be seen that representation is a crucial criterion – both in the 
citizen panel and Steering Committee as well as in the composition and selection of the experts. To 
assess how representation was achieved in a consensus conference Rowe and Frewer (2000) developed 
the following questions:  
i) Were all persons with a legitimate interest in the issue (and therefore the outcome of the 
participation exercise) clearly identified?  
ii) Were participants appropriately selected from among the group of stakeholders? 
iii) Was the right balance achieved between participants acting as representatives (delegates) 
and participants acting in an individual capacity?  
iv) Was enough effort made to get the right participants?  
v) Whatever the intentions, was the group of participants actually representative (and stayed 
that way during the course of the exercise)? 
 
The criterion of representation has been scrutinized in the literature on consensus conferences. 
Davies, Blackstock, and Rauschmeyer (2005) have written an exquisitely nuanced and well-argued paper 
that, among other things, identifies three aspects surrounding the choice of participants for what they call 
“minipublics” (consensus conferences). These are 1) the recruitment problem, 2) the composition 
problem, and 3) the mandate problem. Using the typology presented in their article, it is suggested that 
random selection best characterizes the kind of recruitment method typically used in consensus 
conferences.  By this they mean that participants are chosen using quotas stratified by social and 
demographic categories such as gender, age, social class, and locality. “The rationale for these 
categories is that they are assumed to relate to significant differences in perspectives on an issue, 
deriving from the different life experiences and interests likely to be associated with these categories.” 
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Such an assumption, they contend, is problematic because it assumes a relationship between the 
individual’s location in the social structure and their value position – an assumption which, even if it holds 
on average, may well easily be false for a particular individual (Davies, et.al., p. 603) [italics in original]. 
The composition problem requires even more judgment as organizers make decisions about 
proportionality (which may lead to the absence of minorities or their marginalization within the group), 
selectivity (meaning only a purposively chosen selection of categories are represented), and/or 
universality (all categories are represented). Considering the desire to keep the numbers on a lay panel to 
around 14 persons, the result is usually something of a compromise between selectivity and universality. 
The mandate problem refers to the ultimate authority that the participants hold within the process, or 
their responsibility in relation to others (p.606). Of the four possible positions they identify – delegate, 
trustee, guardian, and individual – it is as an individual that the person is selected for a consensus 
conference. Steering Committees or organizers will need to be clear about whether they expect that the 
person should adopt a “citizenship perspective” or whether the person’s role within the process should be 
to solely represent and articulate his/her own personal perspective. An interesting conundrum can 
develop such that if the ultimate goal is consensus on the development or application of a technology, do 
the members of the citizen panel represent only their own personal perspective, or do they try to act as 
proxy for all citizens (i.e., as ideal deliberators with tutored preferences)  in terms of a result? Davies, 
Blackstock and Rauschmayer offer a different solution to this problem by suggesting the use of a different 
sort of recruitment process – one that ‘represents arguments’ instead of individuals or groups. In this 
perspective, they note, the only way to ensure a ‘representative’ sample of discourses is to start from the 
discourses themselves: selecting a sample of individuals based on their fundamental value positions, 
rather than seeking to represent characteristics of the population that may be irrelevant to the discussion 
at hand (p. 608). At first blush this idea does seem to have merit, but upon reflection a number of 
questions come up: how is this different from a stakeholder role? Does this presume that arguments will 
not change during the consensus conference process? Using Kitcher’s idea, individuals who have 
fundamental value positions can be characterized as deliberators with UN-tutored preferences. The point 
of deliberating with others is to arrive at “tutored preferences” that will match the social values embedded 
in well-ordered science. 
Additional insight into the criterion of representation has been elucidated by Mark B. Brown 
(2006). He makes the point that citizen panels are far less participatory than their historical counterparts 
“from ancient Athens to New England town meetings” because the initiative comes from the organizers, 
rather than the citizens themselves. Random selection does not provide an equal opportunity for 
everyone to participate in addressing a given…issue. It provides merely an equal probability of being 
chosen to participate [italics in original]. On the point of participants being able to represent different 
social perspectives, he makes the point that the immediate aim of representing perspective is 
deliberation rather than decisionmaking; thus, the inclusiveness of deliberation can be judged 
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according to gradations of richer and less rich deliberation, rather than the less forgiving criterion of fair or 
unfair representation of interests [my emphasis] (p. 16).  
The criterion of representation, then, is not such a simple matter to either define or assess. What 
can be hoped for is that the organizers of an ideal consensus conference would have had given much 
thought to the implications of their choice of methodology to select individuals. The framework provided 
by Rowe and Frewer presented above is cognizant of these facets; how do the three example consensus 
conferences fare when the criterion of representation is applied? 
In the UK Plant Biotechnology Consensus Conference, Purdue (1999) notes that the Steering 
Committee not only lacked an environmentalist, but the Lay Panel was chosen in such a way (on the 
basis of “complex psychological tests”) that privileged the lack of a position on biotechnology. In addition,  
 
The whole construction of the quality of their ‘layness’ did seem to induce an undue 
deference to the experts, irrespective of the expert’s actual level and area of 
competence. While members of the Lay Panel were encouraged to take on a very 
challenging role, their capacity to mount an effective challenge to expert power was 
restricted by the accentuated innocence from which they were expected to operate 
(p.88). 
 
The insight I took from this passage is: while the requirement that a participant not hold an established 
position with respect to the technology under consideration is to ensure open-mindedness and avoid 
undue influence by that member among the lay panel - it does nothing to mediate the power relations 
between the lay panel and the experts; indeed, it may exacerbate them.  
The U.S. Telecommunications Consensus Conference project staff approached the 
representation issue by applying a ‘mix and match’ approach that attempted to anticipate how different 
people would interact together, based on address, occupation, age, educational attainment, and the 
response to a short essay question. Project staff and steering committee members acknowledge that this 
effort likely yielded a group of participants biased toward civic-mindedness (Guston, 1998). Given the 
discussion on ‘mandate’ above, perhaps this was a sensible approach. 
The Australian consensus conference recruited participants by newspaper advertisements. In an 
effort to arrive at “a slice of Australian society,” the Steering Committee decided to select one urban 
dweller and one rural dweller from each of the biggest states, as well as a person from a remote area. In 
the view of the evaluators, this resulted in the composition of a panel with a bias toward regional, rather 
than urban representation (not at all reflective of Australia’s predominantly urbanized population). In 
addition, the absence of a pre-conference interview to assess attitudes and values resulted in a number 
of individuals who displayed “firm religious beliefs” leading to reservations by the Steering Committee as 
to how open the panel would be to scientific information or even to change (McKay, 1999, 6.2).  
 
The criterion of task definition 
A second criterion from the framework by Rowe and Frewer (2000) is task definition. Questions they 
ask with reference to this criterion are: 
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i) Was the context to this exercise clearly identified? 
ii) Was the scope of the exercise clear and appropriate? 
iii) Were the aims and outputs clear and appropriate? 
iv) Was the rationale for choosing this particular type of exercise clear and 
appropriate? 
 
In the U.S. example, Guston (1998) states that the directorate - the four individuals from the 
principal sponsoring organizations - chose the telecommunications topic from among several other topics 
because of their perception that the “media appetite” for it was the greatest. He understood from the 
organizers that this consensus conference was intended more in the mode of a “proof of concept” 
exercise than as a deliberative exercise aimed at directly informing and influencing policymakers in 
government. In addition, while the organizers might have been moved to select this topic because of its 
perceived relevance and timeliness with regard to an actual legislative agenda, in actual fact the lay panel 
declined to take up the legislative issues although they had received a briefing on them. Feedback from 
participants, especially those in government, revealed that the timeliness of the topic was also 
miscalculated as the Congress had “dealt with such issues in the Telecommunication Act of 1997 passed 
just three months prior [to the consensus conference] and the pending regulatory decisions would be 
much more detailed in their specification of already-expressed legislative goals (p.15). Rather starkly, 
Guston stated that “this panel was the creation of an ad hoc collection of private groups with minimal 
public sponsorship at the national level” (p.16). Nevertheless, if one goes back to the stated task 
definition as being a “proof of concept” exercise, the consensus conference was arguably a success – 
and, until 2001, remained the only example of a consensus conference mounted in the United States 
(Torres, 2004). 
In the U.K. example, Purdue (1999) noted that the pre-conference material sent out by the 
Science Museum suggested that the purpose of the conference was to ‘test out’ a form of governance 
developed in Denmark. The choice of the topic, he suggests, was restricted to plant biotechnology on the 
grounds that genetic manipulation of humans and animals were likely to be too contentious an issue for 
the lay British public. Purdue stated that environmentalists suspected that the Science Museum was 
hoping that plants could provide a non-contentious starting point for public acceptance of biotechnology. 
The aim of the conference according to remarks by several of the major players was to educate the public 
about biotechnology. For example, in his opening remarks Earl Howe explained the importance of the 
biotech industry and therefore the public understanding (and support) of it. Purdue takes this as evidence 
that “the conference was framed in terms of the deficit of public understanding needed to be made good if 
science and technology were to maintain …momentum” (p.86). 
In Australia, the task definition for the consensus conference was noticeably more open-ended 
and inclusionary than either the U.S. or U.K. examples. The objectives published in the report by the 
conference evaluators were: 
i) To facilitate broad public debate from a plurality of perspectives including 
commercial interests, health and safety, consumer rights to information, 
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environmental sustainability, trade imperatives, ethical concerns, research, 
regulation and so on. 
ii) To empower members of the Australian public (the Lay Panel) to gain an 
informed understanding of ad provide input to this sensitive and important major 
technological issue, within the context of their own values and priorities. 
iii) To gain insight for all stakeholders into the Australian public’s plurality of views 
on gene technology. 
iv) To bridge the gap and create greater mutual understanding between experts and 
Lay Panel (which may or may not lead to greater agreement) (McKay, 1999). 
 
At least on paper the task definition was not framed in terms of a deficit in citizen knowledge or 
understanding but rather as an acknowledgement of the “plurality of perspectives” that exist among 
stakeholders, by which is meant both experts and the general public. Indeed, as Dietrich and Schibeci 
(2003) note, the Australian consensus conference provided the lay panel with the “…autonomy to draw 
discussions with [the] experts beyond the normal narrow technical boundaries typical in technology 
planning formulation.” The Australian example is instructive because the objectives were supplied upfront 
by conference organizers.  
 
The criterion of influence 
 The criterion of influence (impact) is somewhat narrowly defined in the framework by Rowe and 
Frewer (2002). Questions relating to the influence of the consensus conference are: 
i) Were better specific decisions made as a result of the exercise? 
ii) Did the exercise have a positive impact on corporate policy-making 
procedures? 
iii) Did the exercise have a positive impact on the general corporate approach to 
handling the issues? 
iv) Did the exercise bring a significant amount of constructive media attention on 
to the issues? 
 
References in the above questions to “corporate policy-making” can be widened to mean 
government policy-making as well. Normally, this would be the one criterion that a prospective adopter of 
the consensus conference model would scrutinize most closely, for if it cannot be shown that a 
participatory exercise has had a definable, measurable effect, why hold one? One of the main complaints 
about participation methods is that they often have been perceived as ineffectual, simply being used to 
legitimate decisions or to give an appearance of consultation without there being any intent of acting on 
recommendations. This results in public skepticism and distrust concerning the motives of sponsors 
(Rowe & Frewer, 2000, p. 15).  
 Our three sample consensus conferences do not seem to fare well on this criterion. According to 
the independent EUROPTA Report, the British case showed that the consensus conference had a 
negligible effect on the (social) assessment of plant biotechnology and the related policy debate (let alone 
policymaking) (Klϋver, et. al., 2000, p.75). In the United States, Guston (1998) reported in his evaluation 
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that the single greatest area of consensus among the respondents (to a post-consensus survey) was that 
the Citizens' Panel on Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy had no actual impact. No 
respondent, not even those governmental members of the steering committee or expert cohort, identified 
any actual impact (p.15). The Australian evaluators (who were engaged to evaluate the process, not the 
outcome or impact) nevertheless articulated sentiments that are common in the literature about 
participatory exercises: 
Before the Conference, the expectations of the Steering Committee of how the Report 
would be received varied from doubt, even cynicism, about its likely influence, through an 
expectation that its views would be taken into consideration, to hopes, if not expectations, 
that both the Consensus Conference and its Report would be influential. (McKay, 1999, 
sec.8). 
 
To make sense of these diverse findings and try to pull out useful insights with regard to the viability of 
the consensus conference as a mechanism of participatory technology assessment, it is necessary to 
return now to the issues that opened this discussion. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 I began by taking Kitcher’s well-ordered science as a useful vehicle by which different consensus 
conferences could be judged against an “ideal.” The Danish model, precisely because it is so well known 
and emulated, presents itself as a likely candidate for the “ideal consensus conference,” yet it is apparent 
that many of its features evolved out of a particular cultural context. Would each country need to have 
similar institutions and traditions like Denmark’s in order to mount a successful consensus conference? 
Since this can obviously not be correct, the strategy of delineating certain key criteria that, if present, 
would characterize an ideal consensus conference is one procedure that can be followed. This is what 
Rowe and Frewer (2004) attempt with their evaluation framework. I mentioned the difficulty of applying 
evaluation criteria to a consensus conference after the fact and this is also born out by Rowe and Frewer 
when they state “[w]ithout typologies of mechanisms and contexts, and an attempt by researchers to 
adequately define the exercise(s) they are evaluating against these, little progress will be made in 
establishing a theory of ‘what works best when’ “(p. 551). Nevertheless, I examined three criteria: 
representation, task definition, and influence, which brought up some of the issues that can attach to such 
seemingly straightforward criteria. When applied to the three consensus conference examples from the 
U.K., U.S., and Australia, it will be recalled that there were mixed results.  
 From what has been discussed in this paper I finish with three general observations: first, the 
value of using an “ideal” consensus conference (by means of an explicit evaluative framework) is 
necessary for the continued improvement of research on participatory mechanisms. Second, the 
“outcome” of a consensus conference may not be immediately known or usefully interpreted on a strictly 
quantitative basis alone. This is largely due to the third observation: our models for understanding how 
people feel about science and technology applications and their participation in deliberative exercises are 
still too limited. I flesh out these observations below. 
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A fundamental insight achieved by using the Rowe and Frewer framework is that evaluation can 
be applied to either the process used in a consensus conference or the outcome, but is rarely applied to 
both. Rowe and Frewer conducted a search of evaluation studies using the search string: “citizen or 
public AND participation or involvement AND evaluation or assessment” in major journals dating from 
1981 (Rowe and Frewer, 2004b). They identified (with certain exclusions) 30 empirical studies of public 
participation exercises that established a definition of effectiveness a priori. On the question of outcome 
versus process, Rowe and Frewer observe that institutional and societal responses to a particular 
exercise may be manifest months or even years after an exercise has finished (p. 520). 
This forms the basis for my second observation and is borne out with respect to the U.S. 
consensus conference on telecommunication and the Internet by Richard Sclove (personal 
communication, Dec. 9, 2005). He stated that although the consensus conference was not intended to 
have a direct effect on public policy, it was intended to “show that Americans could do this” [run a 
deliberative consensus conference]. Further, he said that largely as a result of the 1997 consensus 
conference, Loka Institute Board member Langdon Winner was able to successfully lobby Congress in 
2003 for a provision in the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (P.L.108-153, 
Section 2, b.,10, D.) that would require participatory mechanisms (like consensus conferences) be used 
to evaluate and guide research and development in nanotechnology: 
… I believe Congress should seek to create ways in which small panels of ordinary, 
disinterested citizens, selected in much the way that we now choose juries in cases of 
law, be assembled to examine important societal issues about nanotechnology. The 
panels would study relevant documents, hear expert testimony from those doing the 
research, listen to arguments about technical applications and consequences presented 
by various sides, deliberate on their findings, and write reports offering policy advice. 
(Winner, 2003). 
 
The point to be taken from the telecommunications example is that there is no linear route 
from the process to the expected outcome which leads to my third observation: any mechanism 
involving people is messy. People can be quixotic; they may not even know their own minds until 
presented with a persuasive case articulated by another person. They may just as likely be 
reacting to the authority of the messenger as to the message. Only the Australian evaluators 
touched upon this: “It happened that this panelist was also a persuasive and influential personality 
and he was opposed to gene technology as an unwarranted interference with nature. The material 
he introduced, combined with the views of some of the preparatory speakers, was influential in 
shifting the views of those Panelists, open to new developments in science in general and in 
genetically modified food in particular, to a more cautionary position” (McKay, 1999).  
It could be that our models for evaluation merely reflect the age-old division between (and, 
some would say, preference for) quantitative “scientific” methodologies over “soft” qualitative 
social science-oriented methodologies. The call for more rigorous instruments and methodologies 
by which to measure smaller and more testable elements is framed and informed by a certain way 
of looking at the world, as is the alternative critical approach which favors context and an active 
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construction of the message by participants in a consensus conference. This duality has much in 
common with the dynamic nature of the public understanding of science (PUS) models alluded to 
earlier in the paper.  
In addition to the deficit and critical models of PUS, a third model has been described by 
Maja Horst (2005) which seems particularly well-suited to how we can think about and evaluate 
the success or failure of a consensus conference. This perspective, which she labels “negotiated 
credibility in networks” or the “network” model for short, draws on analyses by Mike Michael in 
which “the public” is de-romanticized; instead, publics (plural) are seen as heterogeneous  and 
characterized by stresses, discontinuity, fractures and non-linearity (Michael, M. as cited in Horst, 
2005, p.9). There is a shift from the role of citizen to the role of consumer where science has 
become a consumable good which is distributed, consumed and evaluated in competitive settings. 
This change in focus sees “..people engaging in communication about science motivated by an 
individual experience of their own particular needs, and not primarily in order to fulfill a universal 
role as enlightened and educated citizens. In the network model, publics are temporal 
constructions of users of scientific knowledge with a plurality of ways of evaluating … knowledge 
and the emphasis is on contextual networks of negotiations over usability, credibility and 
influence” (Horst, 2005, p.10).  
What relevance do these characterizations have for evaluating consensus conferences? 
Horst writes that: 
In traditional PUS, expertise is a function of the authority of science, whereas in critical 
PUS it is a function of procedural rules. But in the network model, there is no way of 
establishing such authority in advance. ‘Time will tell’ is the ultimate answer to questions 
about the robustness of knowledge [substitute ‘evaluation of a consensus conference’]. 
Socially robust knowledge is that which people continue to subscribe to…. 
 
The negotiation around expertise and credibility is something that only the Australian evaluators 
mentioned – might this be because the evaluators, whether knowingly or unknowingly – applied 
a method of evaluation that is closer to the contested nature of the network model? 
A way of getting around the time lag in this model and explore the possible robustness of 
knowledge, she says, is to stage an interim settlement by having some kind of 
measurement of preferences (in the form of election or poll) or a negotiation between 
parties. However, in the network model there is no normative ideal of consensus. Rather, 
negotiation can be one way of engineering a measurement of preferences, so that the 
multiplicity of individual preferences can be made visible to the policy makers (p.11). 
 
Here, then, it seems we have come full circle. If we accept the consensus conference as a 
model of participatory exercise that is negotiated, adaptive, and always dynamic, then it follows 
that purpose of the evaluation will be to “take the temperature” of a given group of citizens with 
tutored preferences. The well-ordered science envisaged by Kitcher can thus be realized – 
again, and again, and again…! 
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Appendix 
Note on tables: I compiled the information about each consensus conference from the evaluation articles 
cited; that is, Purdue (1999), Guston (1998), and McKay (1999). It was my judgment that the information 
should be available to interested readers, but would impede the flow if included in body of the paper. 
 
 
1. 1994 - U.K. National Consensus Conference on Plant Biotechnology  p. 24  
 
2. 1997 - U.S. Citizen’s Panel on Telecommunications and the Future  
of Democracy        p. 25-26  
             
3. 1999 - First Australian Consensus Conference on Gene Technology  
in the Food Chain        p. 27   
       
4. Rowe and Frewer Checklist for Evaluators     p. 28-29  
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U.K. National Consensus Conference on Plant Biotechnology 












Representatives drawn from Science 
Museum, Parliamentary Office of 
Science & Technology, Zeneca 
Seeds UK, Consumer’s Association, 
former editor of New Scientist, 
academic in social psychology. In 

















ii. Use of facilitator? 
 













i. Internal on three 
dimensions: impact on 
participants and general 
public; perceived usefulness 
of this dialogue model by 
funding agencies, and 
others; strengths and 
weaknesses of the 
consensus conference as a 
special form of technology 
assessment.  
 
ii. A professional facilitator 
was used. 
In essence, the lay panel [gave] the 
field of plant biotechnology its qualified 
support. The panel conclude[d] that, 
"there is scope for people to intervene 
in controlled ways which have the 
potential to provide significant benefits, 
and at the same time to satisfy the 
requirements of those people who feel 
that matters are progressing too quickly 
with an implied lack of care". The lay 
panel advocate[d], among other things, 
tightening up the regulations governing 
the release of genetically modified 
plants into the environment, 
establishing effective international 
controls over the commercial 
Purdue, D. 
(1999) 
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exploitation of plant varieties, and 
providing consumers with clear and 













1997 EPIIC Program at Tufts 
University, the LOKA 
Institute, Massachusetts 
Foundation for the 
Humanities, Technology 
Review magazine (MIT), 
UMass Extension, 
UMass College of Social 
& Behavioral Science, 
Amherst College, NSF. 
The directorate – 
formed from four 
members of the 
principal sponsoring 
organizations – 
established a 12 
person steering cttee. 
composed of 
activists, academics, 
and reps of 
sponsoring, expert, 
and targeted groups. 
In addition, a project 
manager was hired. 




selected experts after 
reviewing the 
questions from the lay 
panel. 
Sequence of activities i. External/Internal eval/assessmt 
ii. Use of facilitator? 
2 weekend preparatory sessions with written 
briefings and guided exercises.  
Day 1: presentations of experts to panel.  
Day 2: discussion of expert testimony and writing 
of statement.  
Day 3: presentation of 4-page statement at a 
press conference attended by media. 
 
i. External eval: Professor David Guston, Rutgers 
University (No. 5 in the Bloustein School Working 
Paper Series 9/3/98) 
 
ii. 2 professional facilitators were used. 
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Overall conclusions or recommendations 
Policymaking 
    We, the people of the Citizens' Panel on Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy, want to 
return to the vision of the founders of our country: government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people… 
We feel that business interests, profit motives and market forces too often dictate public policy to the 
exclusion of the interests of the people (an example of which is the 1996 Telecommunications Act). The 
new technology creates an even greater risk of the abuse of power.  
    Policymakers need to anticipate the presently uncharted effects of the new technology, taking into 
account all aspects of a community (for example, the effect of Internet shopping on a local 
commercial/retail economy).  
Since business benefits from consumer spending, it must be strongly encouraged to return a 
percentage of profits to the community. Examples of what these funds could be used for include skill 
development for all ages, grants to nonprofit organizations for equipment, freenets, etc.  
    We believe that policymaking positively impacts the future of democracy if a balance can be 
maintained between citizens' voices, corporate interests and government administration. There must be 
structures in place for citizen consensus panels that represent those people who will be affected by the 
decision to engage in meaningful debate on policy that remains above the partisan fray and allows 
deliberation and critical thinking. The Internet may hold more potential for this kind of participation than 
other forms of debate. But it also has more potential for polarizing people in like-minded chat rooms. 
Government can assume the role of initiator of citizen involvement through grants and subsidies and 
through research on programs to increase the interaction of citizens and government and involve 
citizens in decision-making. Citizen participation in the process of democracy does not make money. 
Telecommunications policy needs to support Internet versions of C-SPAN and citizens' panels.  
   
Contents and Standards 
    The most reliable, usable and informed Internet content and standards will come from three areas, 
working both together and separately: governments (not by lawmaking, but, for example, by 
contributing research); socially responsible businesses; and knowledgeable and responsible citizens. 
We are concerned about misinformation on the Internet. Misinformation leads to poor decision-making. 
Data and information integrity is a question of reputation and "record" built up over time. We encourage 
the development of "seals of approval" for accurate and trustworthy Web sites.  
    We are concerned with maintaining First Amendment rights--freedom of speech--with respect to the 
Internet. Our society has already shaped First Amendment rights and we believe these rights should 
apply equally to the Internet. There is a flip side to these rights, however. The First Amendment also 
allows anonymously maintained Web sites. We recognize that, by using these sites, we accept the risk 
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of not knowing who is informing us--just as when one reads an anonymously (or pseudonymous) 
published book. We see moral integrity as an issue of personal responsibility. As a society, there may 
be certain materials or information that we consider unacceptable. As a result, we encourage the 
development of products that give us the personal choice to limit access by our children to certain Web 
sites.  
    To those towns and cities that would use taxpayer dollars to hire private companies to block 
children's access to Internet pornography and other offending materials on the computers of public 
libraries, schools, and community centers, we encourage them to form volunteer citizens' panels, 
representative of their communities, that would agree to decide on blockable sites on behalf of their 
fellow citizens.  
    We strongly believe in the individual's right to privacy. We believe there is a need for legislation to 
prevent access to an individual's private, personal data files and other computer data without prior 
approval by the individual.  We also believe that there is a need to require timely correction of any 
misinformation in their personal data files. We understand the government's need to monitor certain 
types of data, but only after due legal process under the Fourth Amendment. As information goes 
global and worldwide satellite coverage becomes possible, the United States has a responsibility to set 
an example of integrity in content. We are concerned about maintaining a free flow of information while 
not taking advantage of other countries through exploitative commercialism.  
   
Universal Service 
     We hold this truth to be self-evident: that a citizenry connected by the Internet and other emerging 
interactive technologies will be more likely to ensure the future of democracy. We believe that universal 
service, rather than universal access or "affordable" service, should be an important national goal. 
Universal access means that the infrastructure exists; universal service is the ability to take advantage 
of that access, including the ability to broadcast.  We agree that connecting K-12 classrooms, public 
libraries, and nonprofit health centers to the Internet is an excellent first step; however, we caution that 
it should not be the only step. We believe that each state, community and perhaps each neighborhood 
should come to its own solution(s) about the placement and means of funding additional equipment; 
however, we suggest that each community:  
1. periodically redefine its definition of universal service in light of new technology, and  
2. take care to include unrepresented and underrepresented groups. 
    We encourage the creation of community Internet centers and freenets, and strongly recommend 
that equitable funding mechanisms be found to provide grants to local governments and nonprofit 
organizations. We believe that ensuring universal service will positively impact the future of democracy 
by empowering individuals and strengthening ties among and between groups, and by increasing 
communication throughout all levels of society. 
Universal service, however, means little without education.  
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First Australian Consensus Conference on Gene Technology in the Food Chain 
Year Sponsors 
Selection of steering 
group 
Recruitment method 




1999 Australian Museum and 
Australian Consumer’s 
Union with stakeholders 
that included state and 
Commonwealth gov. 
depts., CSIRO, and 
many R & D orgs. 
Australian Museum with the 
ACA rep. Committee chosen 
included people from 
academia, industry, 
journalism, Aust. Public 
service, CSIRO, NGOs, and 
R & D. Each stakeholder 
group (17) had a rep. on the 
Steering Committee. 
A market research 
company was hired 
which placed ads in 
suburban and regional 
newspapers. 
Additional citizens 









  Education and Technology 
    If the free flow of information is the foundation of democracy, then access to information is the 
cornerstone of democracy. Merging computer technology with education will greatly enhance access to 
information. In enhancing access to information, it is important to recognize that computers, like 
blackboards, are merely tools. We need nurturing of critical minds and encouragement of productive 
ways to use new information. This is best accomplished by teachers who are trained to use the new 
technology to achieve these goals.  
    All schools should utilize computers (including Internet use) beginning in kindergarten and continuing 
through high school. The appropriate use of computers in the classroom should reinforce the 
curriculum rather than expand it. "Use of computers" should not be a component of the core curriculum. 
For those schools engaged in developing Web sites, we want to underscore the need for multicultural 
and multi-ethnic curricula.  
   "Life-long learning" goals should be supported by making school computers available outside normal 
school hours to the general populace.  
   
Conclusion 
In conclusion, technology gives us tools; we must decide how to use them. Technology itself does not 
develop socially responsible citizens of a democracy, people and society do.  
 
Published critiques: Guston, 1998 





ii. Use of facilitator? 









questions and to 




Day 1: Panel and 
public audience 
heard from expert 
speakers on each 
key question. 
 





Day 3: Delivery of 
report to public 
and media. 
i. External evaluation was 
provided by an outside 
firm. 
 
ii. Facilitator was used as 
well as a writer and a 
publicist. 
• that no new commercial 
releases of genetically 
modified foods be made, 
or unlabelled GM foods 
be imported, until certain 
conditions are met, 
including the 
establishment of an 
independent Gene 
Technology Office within 
a statutory authority and 
an all-encompassing 
labelling system;  
• that companies wishing to 
commercially release GE 
products pay a 
substantial licence fee to 
pay for insurance against 
risk and the funding of the 
independent regulatory 
authority; and  
• that Australia support a 
regulated approach to 
world trade in genetically 
modified organisms in 
negotiations over the 
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Rowe and Frewer (2004) Checklist of Evaluation Criteria and Measures Used in Evaluation 




Aims and outputs 
Rationale for 
exercise 
Was the context to this exercise clearly identified? 
Was the scope of the exercise clear and appropriate? 
Were these clear and appropriate? 
Was the rational for choosing this particular type of 










Were all persons with a legitimate interest in the issue 
(and therefore the outcome of the participation exercise) 
clearly identified? 
Were participants appropriately selected from among the 
group of stakeholders? 
Was the right balance achieved between participants 
acting as representatives (delegates) and participants 
acting in an individual capacity? 
Was enough effort made to get the right participants? 
Whatever the intentions, was the group of participants 
actually representative (and stayed that way during the 










Were there enough people involved, with the appropriate 
level of skill and understanding, in setting up, running the 
exercise, and handling the outputs? 
Was sufficient time available to run the exercise? 
Were there enough suitable facilities and equipment to 
meet the needs of the exercise? 
Was expertise brought in, at the right level, to meet the 
needs of the participants? 
Was sufficient finance available to meet the needs of the 
exercise? 
Was enough good quality information available, at the 







Was the exercise well organized and managed on a 
practical level? 
Were the decision-making (or discussion) procedures 
used appropriate for the discussion/exercise and the 








Was the exercise flexible and adaptable, as necessary? 
Were the decisions made (or conclusions drawn) 
consistent? 
Were the participants competent to contribute 
satisfactorily to the exercise? 
Were any methods used validated with reference to 
standards or some other form of quality control? 
Was there sufficient shared understanding of essential 






Did participants have a sufficient level of control over the 
procedures and outputs of the exercise? 
Did the assessment of the exercise adequately reflect the 
range of views available? 
Were there adequate external checks on independence? 
Transparency 





Did the exercise comply with both the letter and the spirit 
of any relevant legislation or regulations on access to 
information? 
Was there adequate publicity? 
Was there a thorough audit trail, in a proper form? 
Was the audit trail available to all parties? 
Was the information available in an appropriate format, at 






Were better specific decisions made as a result of the 
exercise? 
Did the exercise have a positive impact on corporate 
policy-making procedures? 
Did the exercise have a positive impact on the general 
corporate approach to handling the issues? 
Did the issue bring a significant amount of constructive 





Were all the parties involved early enough to become 
familiar with all the elements of the exercise, in order to 
make a proper contribution? 
Did the exercise take place early enough in the decision-








Was the exercise effective (did it meet all its aims?) 
Was the benefit /cost ratio high? 
Were the benefits fairly distributed across all the 
stakeholders? 
